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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW-1954
trial and notice of appeal, defendant had paid his fine. It was held that
the payment of the fine did not as a matter of law constitute an abandon-
ment of the appeal.
MAURICE S. CULP
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Family problems give rise to much litigation in Ohio particularly on
the matter of divorce and its incidents. Comparatively little appears in the
appellate reports concerning these problems, however. The explanation
is, in the main, the lack of any real contest in divorce cases. Yet part of
the answer may appear'in the Ohio Supreme Court's refusal to take these
cases for fear, understandably, of becoming a glorified divorce court. In
either event, the result is a hodge-podge of domestic relations law in Ohio
-made up of local idiosyncracies and -rules. Uniformity of decisions may
not always be a virtue and indeed may often be inherently impossible. On
the other hand such uniformity is not only desirable but vital in some areas.
One such area involves the relationship of a separation agreement to a
divorce decree. The supreme court decided two cases in this area in 1954.
The rules laid down were not really new, but apparently there was con-
fusion in the lower courts and the supreme court sought clarification. We
may hope the court wil continue this practice.' Two other cases flavoring
of domestic relations were decided by the supreme court during the year,
but their chief ramifications lie in other areas.
2
Several interesting problems were acted upon in the cases reported from
the lower Ohio courts. Very important -to the practicing attorneys is the
holding that execution will not -issue from a decree ordering installment
payments in support of a child.3 More important than -the rule, which is
well known 'to lawyers as matter of practice, as -the reason given for the
rule. The common pleas court said that the levying of execution on such a
'The cases referred to in the text are: Newman v. Newman, 166 Ohio St. 247,
118 N.E.2d 649 (1954). An alimony decree based on a separation agreement may
not be modified unless the power to modify is expressly reserved in the decree.
Mozden v. Mozden, 122 N.E.2d 295 (1954). Mere reference to a separation agree-
ment in the alimony decree with repetition of its provisions is an incorporation of
the decree sufficient to bring the decree within the rule of the Newman case, even
though the agreement is not expressly approved in the decree.
'Signs v. Signs, 161 Ohio St. 241, 118 N.E.2d 411 (1954). See section on TORTs,
infra. The case involves the duty of a father to his child in negligence cases. In re
Tilton, 161 Ohio St. 571, 120 N.E.2d 445 (1954) See section on CIVIL PROCE-
DURE, supra. The case involves the scope of a habeas corpus proceeding on the
matter of custody.
'Roach v. Roach, 116 N.E.2d 46 (Cuyahoga Com. P1. 1954).
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decree in satisfaction of unpaid installments is in effect a modification of
the decree. Therefore the obligor on the decree must have notice and a
chance to be heard. The proper procedure then is to reduce past due install-
ments to judgment and levy execution on that judgment. If a maintenance
decree may be modified as to past installments, then the reasoning is cor-
rect.4 The usual rule in the United States is contra. The rule stated by the
Ohio court plays havoc with the enforcement of Ohio decrees in other juris-
dictions. This -is true because the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution does not require the enforcement of a decree where
installments are unpaid if the past installments are subject to modification
in the rendering state.5
Once again we have the decision that wilful absence for less than the
statutory period of one year does not constitute gross neglect of duty as a
ground for divorce.6 It may be, however, that not much more is required to
turn wilful absence into gross neglect. In one case, a court of appeals de-
cided that a wife's desertion and prior "acrimonious conduct toward her
husband, predicated upon his refusal to purchase a farm in the country"
amounted -to gross neglect of duty.-
A problem of importance to divorced parents was partially solved in a
court of appeals case. A husband and wife were divorced and custody of
their child was given to the wife. The wife remarried and proceeded to
call the child of the first marriage by -the surname of her second husband.
The first husband filed a motion in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County to modify the original divorce decree to provide that his child
should retain his father's surname. In the meantime a school in Avon Lake
enrolled the child under the surname of the second husband, undoubtedly
at the mother's instigation. Then the father, in Lorain County, sought an
-injunction ordering the Board of Education of Avon Lake to list the child
by his father's surname on the Board's rolls. Apparently without regard to
what the outcome of the motion for modification in Cuyahoga County
might be, the Court of Appeals of Lorain County granted what appears to be
a permanent injunction against the Board of Education.8 The basis of the
decision is that the mother did not have the legal authority to change the
child's name. The child might be better off in his social relations if he
bore the name of the second husband, in whose home he lives; but the
father undoubtedly has an interest in seeing the name remain unchanged. It
4 The rule of the case necessarily applies to alimony decrees by a parity of reasoning.
* Furthermore the needy spouse may not be able to reduce the decree to a judgment
in Ohio without personal service on the obligor.
6Casbarro v. Casbarro, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 505, 118 N.E.2d 209 (Ohio App. 1953).
' Slusser v. Slusser, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 7, 121 N.E.2d 317 (Ohio App. 1954).
sKay v. Bell, 95 Ohio App. 520, 121 N.E.2d 206 (1953).
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